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Abstract
Whilst firms often prefer secrecy to patents and process innovations particu-
larly lend themselves to secrecy, we establish a rationale for process innovators
who patent. Using a simple two-period model, we show that under myopic op-
timisation, the incentive to patent rather than pursue secrecy increases as the
probability that the rival firm attaches to it being low-cost falls and as the pro-
portion of the cost reduction due to the innovation, secured by the rival firm in
the period after the patent has expired, falls. However, the gain to the innovating
firm from patenting rather than secrecy strictly increases if the cost reduction
due to the innovation is sufficiently small that the high-cost firm could profitably
bluff that it is low-cost. Finally, allowing the low-cost firm the option of using an
output signal in such cases, may make the patent strategy more or less attractive
relative to the case of myopic optimisation.
Keywords : Cournot Duopoly; Patenting; Secrecy; Uncertainty;
JEL Classification : D23; D43; O12; O34
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1 Introduction
Technological innovation is the random outcome of research and development (R&D)
efforts taking the form of new production processes (offering production opportunities
at lower cost) or new products. R&D is generally expensive and incentives to undertake
such expenditures depend, amongst other things, upon the ability of agents to appropri-
ate the rewards from their investment. Patenting is one way of protecting the rewards
from R&D investment since it allows the inventor an effective monopoly, excluding oth-
ers from making, selling or using the innovation for a specified period of time.1 However,
although taking out a patent on a product or process innovation prevents rivals from
legally copying the innovation it does not necessarily prevent some degree of imita-
tion which may be legal. This is important because one condition of the patent being
awarded is that the innovation be disclosed. So whilst the patent may protect against
copying, the act of patenting may release important information that could be exploited
by rivals in imitating ‘around’ the patent.2 Patenting can also be expensive to take out
and enforce. Hence in the face of these costs alongside the prospect of disclosure some
agents prefer secrecy as a strategy for appropriating the rewards of R&D.
Since the seminal work of Nordhaus (1969), numerous studies have started from the
assumption that innovators will always patent. Interestingly, empirical evidence on the
patent /secrecy question has consistently found manufacturing firms to have higher av-
erage ratings for secrecy rather than patenting as a method of appropriation (examples
using US, Australian and European data, respectively, include Rausch, 1995; McLen-
nan, 1995; Arundel, 2001). Indeed, this has generally been true for both process and
product innovations.3 Arundel (2001, Figure 1, pp. 615) for instance, reports that, of a
survey of R&D-intensive firms, 11.2% gave their highest rating to patents as a method
of appropriation for product innovations, whilst the figure for process innovations was
7.3%.4 The relevant figures for secrecy were 16.9% and 19.8% respectively.
There is a small but growing body of literature devoted to the theoretical consider-
ation of innovation protection that does not explicitly or otherwise assume patenting as
the only option. The earliest major contribution here is due to Horstmann et al. (1985).
In their model, a successful innovator gains important private information about the
profits available to a rival should they imitate or copy the innovation. However, the
1The issue of patenting was put in the agenda for an intense international debate in the Uruguay
round (1986-94) initiated by the Dunkel Draft (Chowdhry and Aggarwal, 1994).
2The breadth of a patent describes how far away from the protected innovation an imitation must
go (in product space for a product innovation, or in inability to match the full cost reduction in a
process innovation) in order not to be considered a copy and hence infringe the patent. An interesting
literature has developed on this issue, including the issue of optimal breadth, see for instance Denicolo`
(1996). However, in order to focus on the impact of strategic output interaction under cost uncertainty
on the incentives to patent in this paper, we assume away imitation.
3One notable exception is the case of Japan (Cohen et al., 1998), where manufacturing firms were
reported to have had a higher rating for patenting in the case of product but, again, not process
innovations.
4The survey included 2849 firms from across Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and Norway.
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innovator’s choice over whether or not to patent the innovation, is influenced by the
fact that taking out a patent may itself signal some of this private information to the
rival firm whilst at the same time offering only limited coverage against imitation. The
central prediction of this model is an equilibrium in which the propensity to patent may
lie between zero and one. Anton and Yao (2004) also analyse the patenting decision
with asymmetric information and incomplete patent coverage. However, in this case
the innovator chooses how much knowledge to disclose alongside the decision to patent
which has a signalling property to the rival firm. Amongst their main findings are that,
whilst small innovations are not imitated, secrecy rather than patenting is preferred
for the protection of large innovations when property rights are weak. Denicolo` and
Franzoni (2004), in a model of sequential innovation, conclude that generally patenting
is preferable to secrecy from a social welfare perspective.
The evidence that secrecy often appears to provide a better option in terms of pro-
tection than patents raises questions about why firms engage in costly patenting. Kultti
et al. (2007) suggest a theoretical answer to this puzzle under which secrecy is only prof-
itable if the innovator knows they are the sole innovator, that is to say, rival firms are
not pursuing secrecy having already made the same discovery. The equilibrium result
is that innovators choose to patent.
In this paper we pursue a related question. Like Kultti et al. (2007) we seek to ex-
plain the incentive to patent, but focus on an argument specific to process innovations.
We recognise that whilst many factors influence an agent’s decision over whether to take
a patent or pursue secrecy, there is an important distinction to be made between the
cases of product and process innovations in the patent/secrecy choice. In the case of a
new product, from the moment it is placed on the market there will necessarily be a good
deal of information available about it. Indeed rivals may well be able to discover the
new product’s deepest secrets through purchasing the product and reverse-engineering.
Contrast this with the case of process innovation where it is not always possible to
determine the production technology from the final product, and hence in the absence
of information disclosure under a patent, there may be very little information available
about the process innovation. This would tend to suggest that the balance of risks in the
secrecy/patent decision is very different in the cases of product and process innovations:
it is much easier to pursue secrecy if the innovation is hidden. If, as Kultti et al. (2007)
note in their preamble, the ratings given to patents as a means of appropriation appear
surprisingly high for innovations in general, then the above argument tends to make the
case even more strongly for process innovations.
This paper offers one possible explanation for why agents might pursue patenting
over secrecy in the case of a process innovation. For simplicity, and to eliminate other
factors which might drive the decision to patent, we assume that, in the absence of a
patent, there is complete secrecy (the rival firm cannot copy or imitate the innovation)
and the rival firm does not discover the innovation through its own R&D.5 Like Kultti
et al. (2007), our argument is based upon asymmetric information and uncertainty.
5The latter effect is central to the argument for patenting put forward by Kultti et al. (2007).
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However, whilst in the former case, uncertainty arises in relation to whether a rival firm
has simultaneously discovered an innovation and is maintaining secrecy, in this paper
the uncertainty relates to whether or not, in the eyes of a rival firm, the firm that has
claimed to have reduced its cost through a process innovation is bluffing or not.
Our model begins with a firm that has achieved a cost-reducing process innovation.
The firm announces that it has reduced its cost in the hope that a rival firm will believe
it and the market will move to an equilibrium favourable to the innovating firm, re-
flecting its cost advantage. However, we assume that unless the innovator discloses the
innovation (i.e. takes a patent) then the innovation is hidden and there is no risk of im-
itation. Secrecy would therefore appear to be an attractive option to pursue. However,
secrecy may have a disadvantage in this context, since under asymmetric information
the local firm knows that the multinational firm may have an incentive to announce
a successful cost-reducing innovation even if it has not been successful in reducing its
cost. If the innovating firm is not able to convince the rival that it has reduced its cost
then its profit, the ability to appropriate the rewards from the innovation, may suffer.
In this setting, disclosure through patenting may be seen as a strategy to resolve the
asymmetric information and uncertainty.6
In the next Section we introduce our simple two-period model. Section 3 considers
the circumstances affecting the patenting/secrecy question for the firm who has been
successful in reducing its cost. The model is solved under the assumption of myopic
(expected) profit maximisation. However, if the innovating firm’s cost reduction is
sufficiently small then this myopic picture may not represent a realistic outcome as it
would be possible for a high-cost firm to bluff that it has reduced its cost. In Section 4
we show how, for innovations with sufficiently small cost impact, the bluff possibility for
a high-cost firm increases the incentive for an innovating firm to take a patent. We then
consider how the innovating firm might use output signalling to address the bluff issue
and show that this may make the patent option more or less attractive to the innovating
firm relative to the situation under myopic (expected) profit maximisation. Section 5 is
a conclusion.
2 A Simple Model
In this section we develop a simple three-period model to allow us to explore the
patent/secrecy question focussing on the central issues of interest.
Assumption 1. The game has two players: firms 1 and 2.
Assumption 2. The firms produce a homogenous good with inverse demand function,
p = a − bx, where p is the market price, x =
∑
i xi (i = 1, 2) is the total quantity
produced and sold in the market and xi is the output of firm i.
We are now going to allow for the possibility that one of the firms (Firm 2) has been
successful in reducing its constant marginal cost due to a process innovation.
6Contrast this with the usual role that disclosure is assumed to play as a deterrent to patenting
(e.g., Scotchmer and Green, 1990; Cohen et al., 1998).
4
Definition 1. Let firm i be denoted F ∗i (Fi) if it has (has not) been successful in
reducing its constant marginal cost.
Assumption 3. (i) Fi has constant marginal cost ci = c ∈ (0, a) (i = 1, 2). (ii) F
∗
i has
constant marginal cost c∗ = c− δ where δ ∈ (0, c).
The following assumptions set out the structure of the game.
Assumption 4. 7 (i) The game has two periods, t = 1, 2. (ii) In each period the two
firms compete in a simultaneous quantity-setting game with firms acting as independent
(expected) profit maximisers. (iii) The game is solved by backward induction. (iv) The
discount rate is r.
Assumption 5. The game begins when firm 2: (i) achieves a cost-reducing process
innovation; (ii) announces that it is F ∗2 and (iii) decides between taking a patent or
pursuing secrecy.
Assumption 6. Under the patent strategy: (i) firm 2 incurs an immediate cost P > 0;
(ii) firm 2’s low-cost status becomes common knowledge; (iii) the patent lasts for period
1 offering firm 2 complete protection from imitation and copying during this time; (iv)
in period 2 the patent runs out and firm 1 adopts a version of the low-cost technology
yielding a proportion γ ∈ (0, 1] of the innovating firm’s cost reduction δ and there is full
information.
Assumption 6 places some important restrictions on the model, that are, nevertheless,
necessary in order to preserve tractability and transparency. The main restriction is that
the patent length, period one, coincides with the time available for the low-cost firm to
meaningfully establish that it is low-cost under secrecy. Hence, the time for which the
patenting firm sees it’s cost advantage eroded following the end of the patent (the second
period) is the same as the time the low-cost firm under secrecy gets to enjoy the gains
if it is successful in achieving an information generated separating equilibrium. Indeed,
within this framework it is shown later that secrecy would always be more profitable to
F ∗2 if firm 1 were able to fully reproduce the cost saving δ (i.e. γ = 1) in the second
period under patenting: the one (first) period gain from certainty under patenting carries
a lower profit than the one (second) period loss due to firm 2 gaining low-cost equality to
the extent that a profitable patent would require a very high discount rate. Introducing
the parameter γ allows us to overcome this otherwise restrictive characteristic of our
simple framework. We rule out γ = 0 though as this would immediately rule out any
benefit from secrecy other than avoiding the cost of the patent.
Assumption 7. 8 Under secrecy firm 1: (i) attaches probability λt in period t (t = 1, 2)
to the event that firm 2 has reduced its cost; (ii) λ1 ∈ (0, 1), hence under secrecy,
7We have chosen the Cournot model with asymmetric information as the backbone of our analysis.
Bonanno and Haworth (1998) compare the relative suitability of the Cournot and Bertrand models for
analysing the behaviour of patenting by firms. They concluded that the Cournot model is a better
model for analysing process patenting whereas the Bertrand model is more suitable for the analysis of
product patenting.
8The common knowledge assumption on λ is a simplification that allows us to focus on the main
information asymmetry here - firm 2’s cost, whilst preserving tractability.
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uncertainty always prevails in period 1; (iii) firm 1 updates the probability to λ2 = 0
(λ2 = 1) in period 2 only if it is convinced by the observed outcome in period 1 that firm
2 is F2 (F
∗
2 ); (iv) otherwise firm 1 leaves λ2 unchanged; (v) λt is common knowledge for
firms making period t decisions.
Given Assumptions 1-7, we can now distinguish between four equilibria.
Definition 2. Let: (i) E(0) represent the full information symmetric high-cost equilib-
rium; (ii) E(1) represent the (myopic) equilibrium under cost uncertainty where firm 2
is high-cost; (iii) E(2) represent the (myopic) equilibrium under cost uncertainty where
firm 2 is low-cost; (iv) E(3) represent the asymmetric cost full-information equilibrium;
(v) E(4) represent the full information asymmetric cost equilibrium under which firm
1 achieves a proportion γ of the cost reduction δ achieved by F ∗2 .
For convenience, we begin with equilibria E(1) and E(2).
Lemma 1. In the case of cost uncertainty the equilibrium must be represented by either
(x1(1), x2(1)) or (x1(2), x2(2)), where,
x1(1) = x1(2) =
(a− c)
3b
−
λδ
3b
, (1a)
x2(1) =
(a− c)
3b
+
λδ
6b
, (1b)
x2(2) =
(a− c+ 2δ)
3b
−
(1− λ)δ
6b
. (1c)
Proof. Given uncertainty Firm 1 recognises that Firm 2 may be high-cost or low-cost
with respective profit:
pi2 = (a− bx1 − bx2 − c)x2, (2a)
pi∗2 = (a− bx1 − bx2 − c+ δ)x2. (2b)
Maximising profit with respect to x2 under the Cournot assumption yields the reaction
functions for F2 and F
∗
2 , respectively:
x2 =
(a− c− bx1)
2b
, (3a)
x∗2 =
(a− c+ δ − bx1)
2b
. (3b)
By Assumption 7, under uncertainty firm 1 attaches a probability λ ∈ (0, 1) to the event
that firm 2 has been able to reduce the unit cost. Its expected profit for a given x1 is
therefore,
E(pi1) = (1− λ)[{a− b(x1 + x2)− c}x1] + λ[{a− b(x1 + x
∗
2)− c}x1], (4)
and since, by Assumption 4, Firm 1 maximizes its expected profit under asymmetric
information, it produces x1(1) = x1(2). Consequently, Firm 2 produces either x2(1), in
the absence of any technological improvement, or, x2(2) if it has reduced its cost.
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Corollary 1. Per period profit under E(1) and E(2) are then:
pi1(1) =
(2a− 2c+ δλ)(a− c− δλ)
18b
, pi2(1) =
(2a− 2c+ δλ)2
36b
, (5a)
pi1(2) =
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ− 3))(a− c− δλ)
18b
, pi∗2(2) =
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ+ 3))2
36b
, (5b)
pi2(2) =
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ+ 3))(2a− 2c+ δ(λ− 3))
36b
. (5c)
Note, pi2(2) is the profit to F2 if it plays x2(2) and hence attempts to bluff that it
is F ∗2 . The asymmetric and symmetric cost full-information equilibria now follow as a
special case of E(2) and E(1), respectively.
Lemma 2. (i) The asymmetric cost full-information equilibrium, E(3), is given by:
x1(3) =
(a− c− δ)
3b
, pi1(3) =
(a− c− δ)2
9b
, (6a)
x2(3) =
(a− c+ 2δ)
3b
, pi∗2(3) =
(a− c+ 2δ)2
9b
. (6b)
(ii) The symmetric high-cost full information equilibrium, E(0), is given by:
xi(0) =
(a− c)
3b
, pii(0) =
(a− c)2
9b
, (i = 1, 2); (7)
Proof. (i) E(2) represents the asymmetric cost equilibrium under uncertainty, hence
under certainty with full information and asymmetric cost, E(3) is derived from E(2)
with λ = 1. (ii) E(1) represents the symmetric cost equilibrium under uncertainty,
hence under certainty with full information and symmetric cost, E(0) is derived from
E(1) with λ = 0.
We now address the remaining full information asymmetric equilibrium in which firm
1 is able to achieve some proportion γ of the cost reduction δ achieved by firm F ∗2 .
Lemma 3. The asymmetric cost full information equilibrium, where firm 1 achieves a
cost reduction of γδ is given by:
x1(4) =
(a− c− δ(1− 2γ))
3b
, pi1(4) =
(a− c− δ(1− 2γ))2
9b
, (8a)
x2(4) =
(a− c+ δ(2− γ))
3b
, pi∗2(4) =
(a− c+ δ(2− γ))2
9b
. (8b)
Proof. E(3) represents the full information asymmetric equilibrium with cost differential
δ. Under E(4) the cost differential is δ(1− γ). Replacing c with c− γδ and replacing δ
with δ(1− γ) in E(3) yields E(4).
3 Patenting versus Secrecy
We now seek to determine the rewards to each firm in each stage of the game and begin
with the more straightforward case, patenting.
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3.1 Patenting
In this section we derive the equilibrium in each period under the scenario in which F ∗2
opts to take out a patent. Throughout the paper, we use a ‘tilde’ to indicate a variable
determined under the patent action.
Lemma 4. If firm 2 takes out a patent the equilibrium outputs and profits in each period
are given by:
x˜1i = xi(3), x˜
2
i = xi(4), (i = 1, 2), (9a)
p˜i1i = pii(3), p˜i
2
i = pii(4). (9b)
Proof. By Assumption 6, by taking out a patent F ∗2 resolves the information asymmetry,
hence period 1 and 2 equilibria are given by the full information asymmetric cost E(3)
and full information symmetric low-cost E(4), respectively.
Corollary 2. The discounted flow of profits to firms 1 and 2 under the patenting, where
P is the cost of taking out the patent, is given by:
Π˜1 ≡
pi1(3)
(1 + r)
+
pi1(4)
(1 + r)2
=
(a− c− δ)2
9b(1 + r)
+
(a− c− δ(1− 2γ))2
9b(1 + r)2
, (10a)
Π˜∗2 ≡
pi∗2(3)
(1 + r)
+
pi∗2(4)
(1 + r)2
=
(a− c+ 2δ)2
9b(1 + r)
+
(a− c+ δ(2− γ))2
9b(1 + r)2
− P. (10b)
3.2 Secrecy
First, we establish the following results which apply generally under secrecy.
Lemma 5. F2 always has an incentive to create uncertainty by announcing it is F
∗
2 .
Proof. From Eqs. (5a) and (7), the per period profit to F2 from E(1) is strictly greater
than (equal to) that from E(0) if λ is strictly positive (equal to zero), since pi2(1) ≥ pi2(0)
if δλ(4a− 4c+ δλ) ≥ 0 and a− c > 0 by Assumption 3.
Lemma 6. Under secrecy E(1) can only be a one period equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly, if firm 2 chooses x12 = x2(1) then it signals to firm 1 that it is high-cost
and in the second period λ2 = 0. Alternatively, if uncertainty prevails in the second
period, (i.e., x12 6= x2(1)) then F2 maximises profit for the one remaining period with
x22 = x2(1).
Lemma 7. In period 2 of the game all firms pursue myopic (expected) profit maximi-
sation based upon the available information.
Proof. The proof follows straightforwardly from Assumption 4, that is the firms are
(expected) profit maximisers in a finitely repeated game with period two as the terminal
period: there is no signalling benefit from deviation from this strategy in the final period
of the game.
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Now, in order to progress towards illustrating the trade-off between secrecy and
patenting, we begin with a major simplification of the framework (which we later pro-
gressively relax).
Assumption 8. All firms are myopic (expected) profit maximisers in period 1 and this
is common knowledge.
This assumption ensures that although F2 will announce that it is F
∗
2 it will not
follow this up with an attempt to bluff it is F ∗2 in period 1 and also F
∗
2 . Equally, F
∗
2
will not attempt to deviate from its myopic maximisation in period 1 in order to signal
it is low-cost.
Lemma 8. Under secrecy and Assumption 8, F1 always plays:
x11 = x1(1). (11)
Proof. By Assumption 7, under secrecy in period 1 λ1 ∈ (0, 1) and by Assumption 8 firm
1 is a myopic maximiser, hence F1 makes its choice under uncertainty and it’s expected
profit maximising choice of output is as derived in Lemma 1.
This turns out to be an important simplification which allows the rest of the per-
period equilibria to be determined straightforwardly.
Lemma 9. Under secrecy and Assumption 8, the equilibrium output configurations in
each period are (i) in the case that firm 2 is high-cost:
(x11, x
1
2) = (x1(1), x2(1)), (x
2
1, x
2
2) = (x1(0) = x2(0)), (12)
and, (ii) in the case that firm 2 is low-cost:
(x11, x
1
2) = (x1(2), x2(2)), (x
2
1, x
2
2) = (x1(3), x2(3)). (13)
Proof. (i) Given uncertainty in period 1, x11 = x1(1) = x1(2) by Lemma 1. Under
Assumption 8, x12 = x2(1) and x
1
2 = x2(2) by Lemma 8, hence neither firm attempts
to deviate from myopic profit maximisation in order to bluff or signal to influence the
period 2 outcome. However, by Lemma 6, x12 = x2(1) results in λ2 = 0 and hence the
high-cost symmetric full information equilibrium, E(0), is obtained in period 2. (ii) By
the same reasoning x12 = x2(2) leads to λ2 = 1 and the second period equilibrium is
E(3).
Corollary 3. Under myopic (expected) profit maximisation, the discounted flow of prof-
its in the case of (i) firm 2 being high-cost, are:
ΠM1 ≡
pi1(1)
(1 + r)
+
pi1(0)
(1 + r)2
=
(2a− 2c+ δλ)(a− c− δλ)
18b(1 + r)
+
(a− c)2
9b(1 + r)2
, (14a)
ΠM2 ≡
pi∗2(1)
(1 + r)
+
pi∗2(0)
(1 + r)2
=
(2a− 2c+ δλ)2
36b(1 + r)
+
(a− c)2
9b(1 + r)2
, (14b)
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(ii) firm 2 being low-cost, are:
ΠM1 ≡
pi1(2)
(1 + r)
+
pi1(3)
(1 + r)2
=
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ− 3))(a− c− δλ)
18b(1 + r)
+
(a− c− δ)2
9b(1 + r)2
, (15a)
Π∗M2 ≡
pi∗2(2)
(1 + r)
+
pi∗2(3)
(1 + r)2
=
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ+ 3))2
36b(1 + r)
+
(a− c+ 2δ)2
9b(1 + r)2
. (15b)
Of course this begs the question: under what circumstances with myopic profit
maximisation will F ∗2 opt for a patent even though it can resolve the asymmetry under
secrecy through its myopic profit maximising behaviour in period 1?
Proposition 1. Given F ∗2 opts for a patent rather than secrecy under myopic profit
maximisation, Assumption 8, if:
ΩM ≡ Π˜∗2 − Π
∗M
2 (16)
≡
[pi∗2(3)− pi
∗
2(2)]
(1 + r)
+
{pi∗2(4)− pi
∗
2(3)}
(1 + r)2
− P > 0
(i) [.] > 0 and {.} < 0.
(ii) ΩM is decreasing (and hence patenting becomes relatively less attractive for F ∗2 ) with
increases in P , γ and λ1.
(iii) ∂ΩM/∂δ is (negative) monotonic in γ and λ.
(iv) ∂ΩM/∂δ = 0 at (γ, λ) = (0, 1) and at other points following the trade-off contour
dλ/dγ = −2(a− c+ 2(2− γ))/[(1 + r)(a− c+ δ(3 + λ))].
(v) ∂ΩM/∂δ > (<)0 for points below (above) this in the (γ, λ) plane.
Proof. (i) First, F ∗2 will only take out a patent if the discounted flow of profits exceeds
that associated with secrecy: Π˜∗2 > Π
∗M
2 , hence substituting from Eqs. (10b) and (15b)
and rearranging yields Eq. (16). The term [.] represents the gain in profit to F ∗2 in period
1 though patenting and {.} represents the gain in period 2. Note, [.] is strictly positive
given λ1 ∈ (0, 1), since limλ1→1[.] = 0, limλ1→0[.] = 4(a−c+2δ)
2−(a−c+1.5δ)2) > 0 and
[.] is negative monotonic in λ1 since ∂[.]/∂λ1 = −2δ(λ1 + 3) < 0. Also, note that {.} is
strictly negative, given by Assumption 3, δ is strictly positive. (ii) ∂ΩM/∂P = −1 < 0;
∂ΩM/∂λ1 = −δ[4(a − c) − δ(6 + 2λ)]/(36b(1 + r)) < 0; ∂Ω
M/∂γ = −δ[(a − c) − δ(γ −
2)]/(4b(1 + r)2) < 0. (iii) First:
∂ΩM
∂δ
=
2 [4(2a− 2c+ 4δ)− (3 + λ)(2a− 2c+ (3 + λ)δ)]
36b(1 + r)
+
8 {(2− γ)(a− c+ (2− γ)δ)− 2(a− c+ 2δ)}
36b(1 + r)2
Hence, ∂2ΩM/(∂δ∂γ) = 2(a − c + 2(2 − γ))/(9b(1 + r)2) < 0 and ∂2ΩM/(∂δ∂λ) =
(a − c + 2δ(3 + λ)/(9b(1 + r)) < 0. (iv) Substituting (γ, λ) = (0, 1) into ∂ΩM/∂δ
reduces both [.] and {.} to zero. Taking the total differential of ∂ΩM/∂δ = 0 yields
dλ/dγ = −2(a − c + 2(2 − γ))/[(1 + r)(a − c + δ(3 + λ))]. (v) The sign of ∂ΩM/∂δ
above (below) the contour in (iv) follow from the negative monotonicity of ∂ΩM/∂δ
with respect to λ and γ.
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Hence, we have shown using a very simple framework that the low-cost firm may
resort to taking out a patent, even if there is no risk of the innovation being copied
or imitated, due to the desire to restore full information to appropriate the gains from
its cost reduction. This is made more attractive as an option the lower the cost of the
patent, the lower the probability F1 places on firm 2 being low-cost, and the lower the
degree to which F1 is able to match the cost reduction at the end of the patent period,
the smaller the incentive to patent. The role of δ is less transparent. Since an increase
in δ increases profit under each of the relevant equilibria, what matters is the relative
size of the increase in profit in each case, which is more problematic to study. However,
an increase in δ is more likely to increase the incentive to patent if λ (γ) is large (small).
We now consider how relaxing the assumption of myopic first-period profit maximisation
a little can affect the result.
4 Bluffing and Signalling
In this Section we consider to what extent the balance between patenting and secrecy
is altered by the relaxation of the assumption of universal myopic (expected) profit
maximisation in favour of the high- (low-) cost firm being able to deviate from its short
term maximisation of profit in order to try to bluff (signal) that it is low-cost.
4.1 Bluffing
We begin by setting out a new condition of the game, relaxing Assumption 8 as follows.
Assumption 9. In period 1, F1 and F
∗
2 are myopic (expected) profit maximisers, but F1
believes that F2 will attempt to bluff that it is F
∗
2 in order to profit in the second period,
if this is profitable.
Essentially, this assumption allows us to model the possibility of F2 bluffing whilst
not over complicating the analysis by allowing F ∗2 to undertake a first-period output
signal.
First, it is necessary to introduce a new equilibrium that is specifically related to the
second period following a successful bluff.
Definition 3. Let E(5) represent the equilibrium in which F2 has convinced F1 that it
is low-cost.
Lemma 10. (i) E(5) can only be a second period equilibrium under secrecy. (ii) Under
E(5) the outputs and profits of F1 and F2 are:
x1(5) = x1(3), x2(5) =
(2a− 2c+ δ)
6b
, (17a)
pi1(5) =
(2a− 2c+ δ)(a− c− δ)
18b
, pi2(5) =
(2a− 2c+ δ)2
36b
. (17b)
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Proof. (i) E(5) requires λ = 1 but it follows from Assumption 7 that under secrecy
in period 1 λ ∈ (0, 1). (ii) Having convinced firm 1 that it is F ∗2 , F2 knows that F1
will play x21 = x1(3). In this knowledge F2’s profit is
(2a−2c+δ−3bx2)x2
3
. Maximising with
respect to x2 yields x2 = x2(5). Consequently, given F2 does not play x2 = x2(3), and
pi1(5) 6= pi1(3).
Lemma 11. The discounted flow of profit available to F2 under a successful bluff in
which setting x12 = x2(2) convinces F1 that it is F
∗
2 is given by:
ΠB2 ≡
pi2(2)
(1 + r)
+
pi2(5)
(1 + r)2
(18)
=
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ1 + 3))(2a− 2c+ δ(λ1 − 3))
36b(1 + r)
+
(2a− 2c+ δ)2
36b(1 + r)2
.
Proof. In period 1, the bluff requires F2 to move from its myopic maximising choice of
x2(1) to adopt x2(2). The period 1 equilibrium is then given by the output combination
(x1(2), x2(2)). However, since firm 2 is not low-cost its profit is not pi
∗
2(2), but rather
pi2(2), in Corollary 1. Having convinced F1 that it is low cost, in period 2 F2 enjoys
pi2(5) as given by Eq. (17b). Discounting accordingly and summing yields Eq. (18).
Proposition 2. The high-cost firm 2 will be indifferent between bluffing and not bluffing
if δ = δB and will have an incentive to pursue a bluff if δ ≤ δB, where:
δB ≡
4(a− c)
8 + 9r
. (19)
Proof. F2 will prefer to bluff iff the discounted flow of profit exceeds the myopic profit-
maximising profit: ΠB2 > Π
M
2 .
Lemma 12. If δ < δB F1 knows that F2 will have an incentive to bluff with x
1
2 = x2(2)
if F1 treats x
1
2 = x2(2) as a signal that F2 is low cost. Hence, by Assumption 7, if δ < δ
B
and x12 = x2(2) then λ2 ∈ (0, 1) and the second period equilibrium is represented by E(1)
under F2 and E(2) under F
∗
2 .
Proof.
Remark 1. It might appear that, given pi2(1) < pi2(5) and hence F2 could not profitably
undertake the bluff if it fails to resolve uncertainty, F ∗2 might be able to convince F1
that it is low-cost for some range of δ < δB, by playing x12 = x2(2). However, as long as
F1 is open to taking the signal of x
1
2 = x2(2) to indicate that firm 2 is low cost, then if
δ < δB there is a danger that F2 will bluff its way in.
Corollary 4. Under Assumption 9, with secrecy and δ < δB then F ∗2 is unable to resolve
the uncertainty and by myopic profit maximisation earns profit:
Π∗B2 ≡
pi∗2(2)
(1 + r)
+
pi∗2(2)
(1 + r)2
=
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ+ 3))2
36b(1 + r)
+
(2a− 2c+ δ(λ+ 3))2
36b(1 + r)2
. (20)
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Corollary 5. Given δ < δB, F ∗2 opts for a patent rather than secrecy if:
ΩB ≡ Π˜∗2 − Π
∗B
2 (21)
≡
[pi∗2(3)− pi
∗
2(2)]
(1 + r)
+
{pi∗2(4)− pi
∗
2(2)}
(1 + r)2
> 0
Proposition 3. ΩB > ΩM , and the gain to F ∗2 from taking a patent relative to secrecy is
strictly greater in the scenario where F2 can bluff than under myopic profit maximisation.
Proof. ΩM and ΩB differ only in respect to the second period reward under secrecy,
sharing the same first period uncertainty and same first and second period outcomes
under the patent. In the case of ΩM the second period under secrecy is the full infor-
mation asymmetric cost equilibrium, whilst uncertainty prevails in the second period in
the case of ΩB. Since pi∗2(3) > pi
∗
2(2), the result follows immediately.
4.2 Signalling
We now take the game a stage further, modifying Assumption 9 as follows.
Assumption 10. Under δ < δB and secrecy, F ∗2 can attempt to signal that it is low-cost
in period 1 and this is common knowledge.
Analysing the scenario under a signal requires the introduction of a few more equi-
libria.
Definition 4. Under cost uncertainty where δ < δB and there exists an information
generating separating equilibrium signal which is profitable to F ∗2 , let: (i) E(6) represent
the equilibrium under which firm 2 is low-cost and pursues the output signal; (ii) E(7)
represent the equilibrium under which firm 2 is high-cost.
Remark 2. Note, E(6) and E(7) are distinct from E(5) and E(1), respectively. This
is because, as we will see, the output of F ∗2 required to signal that it is low-cost under
δ < δB will be different from x2(2) and hence firm 1 maximises expected profit over
different levels of firm 2 outputs than in E(5) and E(1).
Lemma 13. (i) Output for F1 under E(6) and E(7) and output and profit for F2 under
E(7) are, respectively:
x1(6) ≡ x1(7) =
(a− c)(1 + λ)− 2bλx2(6)
b(3 + λ)
, (22a)
x2(7) =
a− c+ bλx2(6)
b(3 + λ)
, (22b)
pi2(7) =
(a− c+ bλx2(6))
2
b(3 + λ)2
. (22c)
(ii) The discounted flow of profit for F2 under myopic profit maximisation in the presence
of a signal x∗2(6), is given by:
ΠSM2 =
pi2(7)
1 + r
+
pi2(0)
(1 + r)2
. (23)
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Proof. (i) Firm 1 maximises expected profit in period one under uncertainty, given by
Eq. (4), as before attaching probability λ (1 − λ) to firm 2 being F ∗2 (F2). Under the
prospect of F ∗2 using the information generated separating equilibrium signal x2(6), F2
has reaction function Eq. (3a). Solving simultaneously gives the following expressions
for the reaction functions of F1 (which is the same under E(6) and E(7)) and F2 (under
E(7)) in terms of x2(6), respectively, Eqs. (22a) and (22b). Period one profit to F2
is then given by Eq. (22c). (ii) With F2 having set out to maximise period 1 profit
myopically, period 2 is the full information symmetric cost equilibrium E(0). Total
profit for F2 over the two periods with signalling in period 1 is then given by Eq.
(23).
In order to achieve an information separating equilibrium signal, F ∗2 needs to ensure
that if F2 were to adopt the signal and successfully convince F1 that it was low-cost,
then the associated profit would be less than under myopic profit maximisation.
Lemma 14. The information generated separating equilibrium signal for F ∗2 under cost
uncertainty and δ < δB is an output strictly greater than the myopic profit maximising
level of output for F ∗2 under cost uncertainty: x2(6) > x2(2).
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose x2(6) = x2(2). Given, under δ < δ
B, F2
gains from playing x2(2) in period one to bluff that it is low-cost it could also profitably
signal using x2(6). However, x2(6) is then not an information generating separating
equilibrium signal.
The following Lemmas address the profit gain to firm F1 from adopting the signal
x2(6), relative to myopic behaviour, in order that we can identify some x2(6) which will
cause this to be a loss-making option for F1, and hence offer a possible information
generated separating equilibrium output for F ∗2 .
Lemma 15. (i) Profit for F2 under E(6), where F2 adopts the signalling output x2(6),
is given by:
pi2(6) =
[2(a− c) + bx2(6)(λ− 3)]x2(6)
3 + λ
. (24)
(ii) The discounted flow of profit for F2 in the case that it opts for the signal x2(6) in
period 1 is given by:
ΠSS2 =
pi2(6)
1 + r
+
pi2(5)
(1 + r)2
. (25)
Proof. (i) Given, by Lemma 13, x1(6) ≡ x2(6) and F2 plays x2(6), industry output is
x1(6) + x2(6) and the proof follows straightforwardly. (ii) By playing x2(6) in period 1,
the high-cost firm convinces F1 that it is low-cost, hence the equilibrium in period 2 is
E(5).
Lemma 16. Let Ψ(x2(6)) ≡ Π
SS
2 − Π
SM
2 (i.e. the gain to F2 from adopting the signal
x2(6) to bluff that it is low-cost, relative to myopic profit maximisation in period one).
Then, Ψ(x2(6)) is negative monotonic in x2(6).
Proof. Ψ′(x2(6)) = 6(a− c−3bx2(6))/[(1+ r)(3+λ)
2], which is negative by noting from
Lemma 14 that x2(6) > x2(2) and further that x2(2) > (a− c)/b given λ, δ > 0.
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The following Lemma identifies a separating equilibrium output signal for the low-
cost firm.
Lemma 17. The cost-minimising information generated separating equilibrium signal
for F ∗2 under Assumption 10 is given by:
x2(6) =
1
18b(1 + r)
{
6(a− c)(1 + r) + (λ+ 3)δ0.5(1 + r)0.5(4(a− c) + δ)0.5
}
(26)
Proof. The minimum requirement for an information generated separating equilibrium
signal by F ∗2 under Assumption 10 is one which, if reproduced by F2 would result
in F2 earning no more profit than under myopic optimisation, hence Π
SS
2 (x2(6)) ≤
ΠSM2 (x2(6)). Since, by Lemma 16(ii), Ψ is negative monotonic in x2(6), the lowest level
of x2(6) to achieve the separating equilibrium is one which yields Ψ = 0. This is also
the cost-minimising signal for F ∗2 . Ψ = 0 is quadratic in x2(6). The solution to the
quadratic is given by
x2(6) =
1
18b(1 + r)
{
6(a− c)(1 + r)± (λ+ 3)δ0.5(1 + r)0.5(4(a− c) + δ)0.5
}
(27)
Notice that the first part of Eq. (27) (the unambiguous part) simplifies to (a− c)/(3b),
which is the equilibrium firm output under the full information symmetric high-cost
equilibrium xi(0). Since any feasible signal by F
∗
2 must be strictly greater than its
myopic equilibrium output x2(3), which in turn is strictly greater than xi(0), the right
hand side of Eq. (27) must add to not diminish the left hand side, hence x2(6) is given
by Eq. (26).
Corollary 6. Under Assumption 10 and δ < δB, if F ∗2 undertakes the first-period
separating equilibrium signal, x2(6), under secrecy, it earns profit:
pi∗2(6) =
1
324b(1 + r)
(28)
(36(a− c)2 + 108δ(a− c)(1 + r)− δ(3 + λ)(3− λ)(4(a− c) + δ)
+6[9δ + λ(2(a− c) + 3δ)]δ0.5(1 + r)0.5(4(a− c) + δ)0.5).
In our most simplistic model with the restrictive Assumption 8, F ∗2 was not able to
signal nor was there a possibility of F2 bluffing. We saw that under these restrictions
F ∗2 still had an incentive to take out a patent under some circumstances. We then saw
that under Assumption 9, in which the high-cost firm was allowed to pursue a bluff but
F ∗2 was not allowed to pursue a signal, the profit to F
∗
2 due to secrecy was lower and
the incentive to patent higher than under Assumption 8. We now turn our attention
to addressing the question as to whether, under Assumption 10, in which F ∗2 is able to
use the signal x2(6) to resolve uncertainty, it now has a greater or lesser incentive to
pursue a patent than under Assumption 8. We begin by establishing the relationship
between period 1 profit to F ∗2 under myopic behaviour x2(2) and non-myopic behaviour
xˆ2(6) (xˆ2(6) 6= x2(2)) where, for simplicity xˆ2(6) is not necessarily the signalling output,
x2(6).
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Lemma 18. Let Θ ≡ pˆi∗2(6)− pi
∗
2(2).
(i) The period one profit for F ∗2 under Assumption 10 and the output xˆ2(6) is the same
as the period one profit for F ∗2 under Assumption 8 and myopic profit maximisation, if:
xˆ2(6) = x2(2)
(3± λ)
(3− λ)
; (29)
(ii) Θ is strictly concave in x2(6);
(iii) Θ is strictly positive in the interval:
x2(2) < xˆ2(6) < x2(2)
(3 + λ)
(3− λ)
, (30)
and strictly negative for:
xˆ2(6) < x2(2)
(3 + λ)
(3− λ)
. (31)
Proof. (i) Note, using Eq. (22a) in x(6) = x1(6) + xˆ2(6), profit for F
∗
2 under the signal
xˆ2(6), can be expressed as:
pˆi∗2(6) =
xˆ2(6) [{2(a− c) + δ(3 + λ)} − b(3− λ)xˆ2(6)]
(3 + λ)
(32)
Further, noting that in Eq. (32), {.} = 6bx2(2), Θ can be written:
Θ =
[6x2(2)− (3− λ)xˆ2(6)]bxˆ2(6)
(3 + λ)
− bx2(2)
2. (33)
Setting Eq. (33) equal to zero and solving for the quadratic in xˆ2(6):
xˆ2(6) =
6x2(2)± {36x2(2)
2 − 4(3− λ)(3 + λ)x2(2)
2}
0.5
2(3− λ)
. (34)
Recognising that in Eq. (34) {.} simplifies to (2λx2(2))
2, completes the proof. (ii)
Differentiating θ in Eq. (33) twice with respect to xˆ2(6):
∂2Θ
∂xˆ2(6)2
= −
2b(3− λ)
(3 + λ)
< 0. (35)
(iii) This follows from the concavity of Θ(xˆ2(6)), since Θ must lie above zero in the open
interval between the roots, xˆ2(6) = x2(2) and xˆ2(6) = x2(2)(3 + λ)/(3 − λ), and vice
versa.
Whilst Lemma 18 establishes the range of xˆ2(6) for which the low-cost firm would
prefer to pursue the signal rather than myopic behaviour in period 1 to achieve a sep-
arating equilibrium in period 2, we have yet to show that such values of xˆ2(6) actually
achieve a separating equilibrium and that such outcomes are viable in the case δ ≤ δB.
We now refine this result with the help of the following Definition.
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Definition 5. Let δ ≡ ρδB ≡ ρ4(a−c)
8+9r
.
Hence, F2 will have an incentive to bluff that it is low-cost iff ρ ≤ 1. Also, for the
purpose of exploring cases where δ ≤ δB, and given δ > 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Proposition 4. Given δ ≤ δB, F ∗2 has a greater (lesser) incentive to pursue a patent
rather than secrecy under the signal x2(6) and Assumption 10 compared with myopic
profit maximisation under Assumption 8 if:
Υ(λ, ρ) ≡ 3λ(1 + r) (36)
+
ρ(3 + λ)
8 + 9r
[
6λ(1 + r)− (3− λ)
{
(1 + r)0.5
(
8 + 9r
ρ
+ 1
)0.5
− 3(1 + r)
}]
< (>)0.
Proof. First, note that under Assumption 8 myopic profit maximisation by F ∗2 in period
one achieves the separating equilibrium E(3) in period 2. The same period 2 outcome
for F ∗2 results under Assumption 10 with δ < δ
B given F ∗2 pursues the signal x2(6).
Hence, in each case the second period rewards to secrecy are identical and the relative
profitability of each depends only upon the first period profit. Second, from Lemma 18,
we know that the period one profit gain to F ∗2 pursuing some xˆ2(6) under Assumption 10
relative to the myopic profit maximisation under Assumption 8, given by Θ, is greater
(less) than zero according to xˆ2(6) < (>)x2(2)(3 + λ)/(3 − λ). Third, modifying this
inequality by substituting x2(2) using Eq. (1c), replacing xˆ2(6) with the signal x2(6)
and substituting using Eq. (26) and replacing δ according to Definition 5, following
some manipulation, gives Eq. (36). One particular step in the manipulation requires
explanation. It is straightforward to show that x2(6) > x2(2), requires that:
(1 + r)0.5
(
8 + 9r
ρ
+ 1
)0.5
− 3(1 + r) > 0. (37)
Indeed, given r > 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1] this inequality always holds. This turns out to be
useful for our purposes and hence in Eq. (36), the term [.] has been constructed (by
adding and subtracting 3(1 + r)(3 − λ)) so that {.} reproduces Eq. (37) and hence
{.} > 0. Hence it is possible to find values of the parameters which satisfy both inequal-
ities. Finally, noting that when Eq. (36) is positive (negative) the signalling scenario
under secrecy is more profitable than the myopic (non-signal non-bluff) scenario, making
patenting relatively less (more) attractive under the former than the latter, completes
the proof.
We now consider the circumstances under which the signalling scenario for F ∗2 is
more profitable than the myopic scenario.
Lemma 19. (i) Υ(λ, ρ) is positive monotonic and strictly convex in λ in the relevant
range.
(ii) Υ(λ, ρ) is strictly convex in ρ in the relevant range.
(iii) Υ(0, ρ) < 0; Υ(1, 1) > 0; Υ(1, 0) < 0.
(iv) Υρ(λ, 0) < 0;Υρ(λ, 1) > 0.
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Proof. (i) Differentiating Eq. (36) w.r.t. λ:
Υλ(λ, ρ) = 3(1 + r) +
2ρ
8 + 9r
[3(1 + r)(3 + 2λ) + λ{.}] > 0, (38)
which is positive since {.} > 0 from Proposition 4. Differentiating again w.r.t. λ we get:
Υλλ(λ, ρ) =
2ρ
8 + 9r
[6(1 + r){.}] > 0. (39)
(ii) Differentiating Υ(λ, ρ) twice w.r.t. ρ, we have:
Υρρ(λ, ρ) = (3+λ)(3−λ)(1+r)
0.5
(
8 + 9r
ρ
+ 1
)
−0.5
[
1 +
(
(8 + 9r)ρ
4
)(
8 + 9r
ρ
+ 1
)
−1
]
> 0.
(40)
(iii) First, substituting λ = 0 into Eq. (36):
Υ(0, ρ) = 3
3ρ
8 + 9r
[3{.}] < 0, (41)
since, ρ ∈ (0, 1] and {.} > 0. Second, substituting λ = 1 into Eq. (36):
Υ(1, ρ) = 3(1 + r) +
4ρ
8 + 9r
[6(1 + r)− 2{.}], (42)
which doesn’t have a unique sign. However, at the extreme ρ = 1, Eq. (42) becomes:
Υ(1, 1) = 3(1 + r) +
24(1 + r)
8 + 9r
> 0, (43)
since {.} = 0. At the other extreme, ρ = 0, we have Υ(1, 0) = 3(1 + r) > 0. Finally,
substituting ρ = 0 into Eq. (36) we get Υ(λ, 0) = 3λ(1 + r) > 0 since λ ∈ (0, 1).
substituting ρ = 1 into Eq. (36):
Υ(λ, 1) = 3λ(1 + r) +
6(1 + r)λ(3 + λ)
8 + 9r
> 0, (44)
since {.} = 0. (iv) First, differentiating Eq. (36) w.r.t. ρ:
Υρ(λ, ρ) =
(
3 + λ
8 + 9r
)
(45)[
6λ(1 + r)− (3− λ)
{
(1 + r)0.5
2
(8 + 9r + 2ρ)((8 + 9r)ρ+ ρ2)−0.5 − 3(1 + r)
}]
.
Substituting ρ = 1 in Eq. (45), [.] reduces to:[
3(1 + r)(3 + λ)−
(3− λ)(10 + 9r)
6
]
> 0 (46)
which is strictly positive given λ ∈ (0, 1). Finally, substituting ρ = 1 in Eq. (45), {.},
can be written as:

(1 + r)0.5
2

 (8 + 9r)
((8 + 9r)ρ+ ρ2)0.5
+
2(
(8+9r)
ρ
+ 1
)0.5

− 3(1 + r)

 . (47)
As ρ → 0, the right-hand term in [.] → 0 but the left-hand term in [.] → ∞, hence
Υρ(λ, ρ)→ −∞.
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Proposition 5. Given δ ≤ δB, (i) patenting becomes relatively more attractive for
F ∗2 pursuing the signal x2(6) under Assumption 10 than under myopic behaviour under
Assumption 8 as λ falls.
(ii) patenting becomes relatively more (less) attractive for F ∗2 pursuing the signal x2(6)
under Assumption 10 than under myopic behaviour under Assumption 8 as ρ increases
if ρ is sufficiently large (small).
(iii) If λ is sufficiently small then the incentive to pursue patenting is always greater for
F ∗2 pursuing the signal x2(6) under Assumption 10 than under myopic behaviour under
Assumption 8.
(iv) If λ and γ are sufficiently close to 1, then the incentive to pursue patenting is
always lesser for F ∗2 pursuing the signal x2(6) under Assumption 10 than under myopic
behaviour under Assumption 8.
Proof. (i) This result follows directly from Lemma 19(i). (ii) This result is a consequence
of the strict u-shaped convexity of Υ in ρ following from Lemma 19 (ii) and (iv). The
strict inequality of the terms in Lemma 19 (iv) when evaluated at the extremes ρ = 0
and ρ = 1 ensure that there exists an open interval of ρ ∈ (0, 1) such that Υρ(λ, ρ), has
the same sign as at ρ = 0 and ρ = 1, respectively. (iii) Since Υ(0, ρ) < 0 in Lemma
19 (iv) is a strict inequality, there exists an open interval of λ ∈ (0, t), where t < 1,
such that the entire u-shaped Υ(0, ρ), for ρ ∈ (0, 1) lies below 0. (iv) Since Υ(1, 1) > 0
in Lemma 19 (iv) is a strict inequality, there exists an open interval of λ ∈ (f, 1), and
ρ ∈ (g, 1) where f, g < 1, such that Υ(λ, ρ), lies above 0.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have employed a simple 2-period duopoly model to demonstrate that
even if a firm can costlessly maintain complete secrecy with regards to a process in-
novation (there is no threat of an unpatented innovation being discovered or copied)
there may still exist an incentive to patent the innovation so as to resolve information
asymmetries. We consider the relative incentives to pursue patenting rather than se-
crecy under three different sets of assumptions. First, we assume that all firms behave
as myopic profit maximisers. Second, we assume that if it is profitable for a high-cost
firm to bluff that it is low-cost then it will do so and this is common knowledge. Third,
we let the low-cost firm have the option of signalling to convince the rival firm that it
has reduced its cost and is not a high-cost firm bluffing.
We show that under myopic optimisation, the incentive to patent rather than pur-
sue secrecy increases as the probability that the rival firm attaches to it being low-cost
falls and as the proportion of the cost reduction due to the innovation, secured by the
rival firm in the period after the patent has expired, falls. However, the gain to the
innovating firm from taking out a patent rather than pursuing secrecy strictly increases
if the cost reduction due to the innovation is sufficiently small that the high-cost firm
could profitably bluff that it is low-cost. Finally, allowing the low-cost firm the option
of using an output signal, may make the patent strategy more or less attractive relative
to the case of myopic optimisation.
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Hence we have demonstrated that for some parameterisations of our model, there
exists an incentive for the low-cost firm to pursue a patent rather than secrecy under
myopic behaviour and that whilst the range of parameters satisfying this outcome will
be larger if a high-cost firm could profitably bluff that it is low-cost, the range may
increase or decrease by allowing the low-cost firm to pursue an output signal.
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